The Iranian Nuclear Program: Issues, solutions and views of Pakistan.
Introduction:
American foreign
policy is based upon the infamous Monroe Doctrine and in fact more importantly
on the ideas of President Woodrow Wilson. Before, going into that let’s first
establish the fact that the international system is anarchic, brutal and based
upon national interest. Thus, the realist worldview takes primacy over
liberalism, which calls for cooperation, diplomacy and disarmament. Woodrow Wilson
always aspired America to put more weight in the international system , but the
rationale was for humanitarian purposes
and the endorsement of democracy. However, it is imperative to fathom
the fact that America has always looked after her geo-strategic interests under
the garb of liberalism. For instance the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine were
not enunciated due to any love lost for Greece, Turkey and other European
countries, but because the Americans had to counter Communism. The reason why
American foreign policy is being discussed here is that it has a direct bearing
on the Iranian Nuclear conundrum. The program which began under the aegis of
the “Atoms for Peace” program made great strides before the Iranian Revolution
of 1979. Things turned for the worst not only between USA and Iran, but the
latter’s nuclear program was also hampered. Iran has maintained her stance of
developing a peaceful nuclear program; Iran considers herself well within the
ambit of the Nuclear Non –Proliferation Treaty of 1968. This paper will
shed-light on the Iranian Nuclear Program; the suspicions attached to it; the
approach of the United States and Israel. Lastly, Pakistan’s view, albeit a bit
insignificant would be the mainstay of the paper. The paper will be divided
into 3 sections. The first will deal with nuclear weapons and deterrence, so as
to provide a conceptual framework for discussing Iran’s penchant for the bomb,
if any. The second part will succinctly trace the genesis and development of
the program to-date. The last part will look at the views of other countries,
to include Pakistan. Apart from that some portion will look into negotiations,
sanctions and possible surprise attacks.
Nuclear Deterrence:
Karl Von
Clausewitz said that war is an extension of diplomacy by other means. He was
very right, but the Clausewitzian war accounts for the horrors
of war through the famous
concepts of fog and friction. Before going into the realm of nuclear bomb, it
is imperative to talk about wars and battles.
A war is a series of battles fought between states with a clash of vital
interests. Battles are fought in different Forward Defended Localities on or
near the border. A war can be limited or all-out, conventional/
sub-conventional or a counter-insurgency. All these kinds of wars are fought by
conventional means: forces and weapons employed to target the enemy on the
battlefield. Threat perceptions compel countries to maintain conventional forces;
however, when an adversary becomes numerically too superior, a country feels
insecure. The concept of security dilemma comes into the equation. What do
nuclear weapons do? Without going into intricate details, we should only focus
on the concept of deterrence for the consumption of this paper.
Deterrence is
the ability to dissuade an adversary from doing something repugnant to the
security interest of the state. This is done through the possession of credible
capability of causing unacceptable damage to the adversary. Deterrence is based
upon willingness, capability and communicating the very capability to the
nemesis, so that it believes that a likely action would be fatal. The types of deterrence are listed below:
1.
Sufficient Deterrence (MAD with multiple
capabilities)
2.
Extended Deterrence (Nuclear umbrella to allies)
3.
Graduate Deterrence (proportionate to threats)
4.
Minimum Credible Deterrence
5.
Existential Deterrence (Deterrence as policy vs
condition)
6.
Non Weaponized Deterrence [1]
Deterrence
primarily hinges upon second-strike capability, which happens to be the ability
to withstand a surprise or a pre-emptive strike, and then be able to retaliate
with a nuclear strike. Hence, the safety and security of the arsenal becomes imperative,
to say the least. Furthermore, an efficient command and control system is
needed to be in place, so as to channelize all nuclear-related activities.
The late Keneth
Waltz was always a great proponent of nuclear weapons, for he believed that it induced
caution. There are plenty of stabilizing
factors of the nukes, to include acting as a power equalizer. Internal
Balancing is or should be preferred over external balancing and bandwagon
approach. States go nuclear because of three themes as identified in the book Eating Grass: the making of the Pakistani
bomb. The themes are national humiliation, national identity and
international isolation.[2]
The genesis of the Iranian Nuclear Program:
Iran is an all-important country of
the Middle East; it has a geo strategic importance of its own. Proximity to
waterways and rich resources of gas and oil has made it an important country in
the foreign policy calculus of the superpowers. This is true because the first
ever covert CIA operation overthrew Mosaddegh in 1953, ostensibly on nationalizing the
oil company.[3]
Till 1979, the United States championed the Shah of Iran. Shah was known to be the protector of American
interests in the region. All said and done, let’s expound upon the nuclear
history of Iran. It was Dwight Eisenhower who gave a historic “Atoms for Peace”
speech at the UN General Assembly session. This set in motion the Eisenhower’s
“Atoms for Peace” program. It was agreed that any country having any kind of
nuclear expertise or material would donate it to International Atomic Energy
Agency, which would in turn help any country which wanted a nuclear program
for civilian purposes. The United States was actually serious about promoting
peaceful uses . Iran began to settle down after the coup of 1953; it became
economically stable enough to be trusted with nuclear technology. Thus, in 1957 we not only saw a nuclear training center shift from Baghdad to Tehran, but a
bilateral agreement was signed between USA and Iran. Moreover, the “Atoms for
Peace” exhibit was opened in the city. The program thus kick started from then
on wards. The bilateral agreement predicated upon a few terms and conditions.
The stipulation was that Iran will stick with the peaceful uses of nuclear
technology. The Americans provided Iran with enriched uranium and a 5 Megawatt
light water reactor. Hence, nuclear power was born in Iran and America was the
midwife.[4]
The impetus was
given, but Iran with its scant scientific prowess could not capitalize on the
platform. The light water reactor was not put to use; it was seen as a
showpiece at the Tehran University. The course of the program changed in 1965.
A young scientist by the name of Akbar Etemad came back to Iran in the very
year. He is deemed as the father of the Iranian nuclear program. He yearned Iran to become a technologically
advanced country, hence he went on with
full heart and soul. Shah of Iran after seeing his credentials mandated him to
work at the Tehran University. Within a few years he handed over the 5 MW
Reactors to the University. It was ironically working on a critical level.
Soon, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) was created so as to
streamline all nuclear-related activities. A significant development took place
in 1968, which perhaps remains the bone of contention between Iran and the
West. Iran signed the Non Proliferation Treaty in 1968. This implied that Iran
agreed on not to make a bomb and only has a right for a peaceful nuclear
program. Shah’s penchant for embarking
on the nuclear program was there for all to see. In 1974, Shah told Etemad that
we needed nuclear power (not weapons) for economic reasons; he believed that
nuclear power was the perfect conduit for economic growth. However, there were
some ulterior motives, such as royal glory and a drive into modernity. As early
as 1960, Shah told the outgoing Majlis
that Iran could no longer afford to live in the middle Ages. One can make out
that Pehlavi wanted a great leap forward through the so-called peaceful
nuclear program. The journey continued under the tutelage of Etemad . Two
developments are noteworthy before the revolution of 1979, one that the Bushehr
nuclear reactor was 85% complete, thanks to the tireless efforts of Etemad .
Then Gerald Ford signed an agreement with Iran, which allowed it to buy
US-built reprocessing facility to extract plutonium. In fact the deal was for a
complete nuclear fuel cycle. The extracted plutonium also can be easily
diverted from civilian to military purposes; therefore this was a momentous
development. Iran had always remained averse of the bomb; however, it is
imperative to understand that the civilian and military side can never be
divorced, due to the ease of diversion. Iran has always been vociferous,
though. There were however, inklings
that the Shah vied for a bomb to show his grandeur. The NPT was signed, but
there were voices against it from the very outset; Etemad also saw it as an
infringement of national sovereignty. The revolution changed things
drastically, to say the least. Ayatollah Khomeini infamously said that nuclear
bombs are UN Islamic. This dissuaded Iran from going overtly nuclear, for Imam Khomeini
was and is still revered. The program
was stifled by the ramifications of the revolution, to include the Hostage
Crisis. A brief discussion on the post
revolution nuclear odyssey would be pertinent.
The international community began to turn a deaf ear to Iran; France and
the US stopped the supply of Highly Enriched Uranium. Despite, efforts of
rapprochement, the damage had been done due to the potent Hostage crisis; the predicament
led to the disastrous Operation Eagle Claw. The program came under the scanner;
the Kraftwerk stopped working on the Bushehr plant, owing to the
intensification of war. Thus, Iran had to cobble-up everything all by herself.
Imam Khomeini always viewed all international organizations with a great deal
of skepticism. The organizations were advancing the cause of Western hegemony. The way the IAEA reacted over Iraqi attack in
1984 gave lot of credence to this notion. The Iranian Foreign minister
questioned the dubious role of the IAEA, for he believed that it was playing in
the hands of world powers. Adversity
brings resolve; a sense and urge of self-sufficiency was evident. One can term
it as Nuclear Nationalism. The program continued with zest and zeal; the
Iranians considered it as a national duty to tirelessly strive to complete the
program. Meanwhile, the Americans did all what they could to thwart a perceived
threat from an Islamic Republic. Before
going into the actualities of the crisis, let’s briefly scan-through, the remaining journey. Iran had
time and again made a clear stance as regards the bomb. David Patrikarakos in his book “Nuclear Iran” has given a very good
account of Iranian views on weapons and theories of deterrence within the lens
of Islamic rubric. Ghahvechi , the
Iranian representative to the UN gave a lengthy speech where he expounded upon
deterrence and weapons unambiguously. However, things were not that
straight-forward. In close circles, there were talks about going for the bomb.
Khamenei believed that a nuclear deterrent was the only way to secure the very
essence of the Islamic Revolution from the schemes of its enemies, as a prelude to the rule of Imam
Mehdi.[5]
This was not the first inkling for the idea of bomb-making; even during the
tenure of Reza Pehlavi , there were indications that a bomb option was on the
table. This can be corroborated by just one statement of the Shah in wake of
India’s so-called peaceful explosion in 1974. The Shah said “ Pakistan and
India talking about nuclear strength might force Iran to reconsider its
options” the point that one needs to make is that the concerns of the West are
not that concocted; there are plenty of reasons for them to be wary of Iran.
One should not go into the debate of the NPT, for America has quite obviously
flouted the treaty by signing the NFDR with India. The program was shrouded in
mystery from 1989 to 2002, not that it is all clear now, but these years were
deemed as lull before the storm.
The Iran-Iraq
War had left an indelible imprint on the minds of the Iranian establishment and
government officials. Rafsanjani’s ascendancy to power gave the program a fresh
lease of life. He was able to seduce Iranian scientists working abroad, to
include Reza Khazaneh. The period from 1989 to 2002 was marked with significant
augmentations, both overt and covert. The former included Russians working at the
Bushehr. There were serious reports of Iran pursuing the first and the second
stage of the nuclear fuel cycle. The stages pertained to extracting uranium ore
to produce yellow-cakes and then converting them to UF6. Moreover, the fact that
Iran had the Par-1 and Par-2 centrifuge components added to suspicion. Now,
going by nuclear theory, it is imperative for a nuke to be supplemented by a
delivery system. One can really not decipher whether Iran went after missiles
for conventional or strategic purposes. However, the presence of sophisticated
Ballistic missiles would have only created skepticism.
All in all, Iran
had not only suggested to go for the bomb, but had started to crack deals to
get equipment; it had centrifuges, sites, yellow cakes and most importantly,
delivery system: missiles. The cats were set among the pigeons. Suspicions may
well be true, but the issue will probably reach what we call a “ripe moment”
in the jargon of conflict resolution. A brief summary of the unfolding crisis
is needed.
The conundrum:
Nuclear program
like we all know is of two kinds, civilian and military. The former is typified
with Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE’s). The civilian program is used for
economic purposes such as energy and medicinal. As mentioned earlier, Iran
signed the NPT way back in 1968. That meant that Iran vowed not to go for the
bomb, and remain under the ambit of the civilian nuclear program. The program
was to be under the strict control of the IAEA. The crisis relates and is
predicated to an alleged cat and mouse game between Iran and the IAEA. It was
in 2002, that an enrichment site was unveiled at Natanz. Furthermore, a heavy
–water plant was instituted at Arak. The site at Arak had the potential to
churn-out plutonium. Both, these sites were not illegal as per the terms of the
NPT. However, there are other stipulations which ought to be followed. The IAEA
must be informed 6 months prior to the establishment of a site. As the
international comity saw the reports in awe, the crisis was underway. The
Iranians were reticent to show IAEA other sites and workshops, but ultimately
acquiesced. The delay was enough for the West to raise eyebrows. Soon a
resolution was passed which baulked Iran from uranium enrichment. There was a
furor in Tehran. There were cleavages within the Iranian high-ups; some wanted to halt the program,
while others wanted the country to go ahead even with a weapon option. Hasan
Rowhani came up with his 5-step plan. First, he wanted to keep the crisis under
control and deter threats. Second, the need to safeguard nuclear facilities was
important. Other plans included, turning threats into opportunities; enhancing
capabilities and legal clout. Tehran subsequently signed the Tehran and Paris agreement,
which manifested good faith on its part.
The spirit of the treaty called for Iran to sign on additional protocols
and cease enrichment. The issue has conflagrated since Ahmedinejad took over.
He ordered the resumption of activities at Natanz, which was seen as a blatant
breach of the Paris Agreement. Things moved in the direction where they stand
today because of the hawkishness of Ahmedinijad. There are two important things
which should be brought to the attention of readers. These anecdotes, so to
speak will be a harbinger of something grievous. Satellite images outside the
sacred city of Qom were shown to Obama. The site was huge, located on the
mountainside of a military base and protected by Anti-Aircraft guns. This
highly-protected and deeply-dug site certainly rung alarm bells among the
American ranks. Secrecy increases suspicion.[6] Then, America offered. During the talks in Geneva, Iran made a somewhat ironic
excuse of not stopping uranium production because they needed to keep the
Tehran reactor running ostensibly for medicinal purposes. Robert Einhorn, an
expert on proliferation got a food for thought. He said “why not offer to ‘swap’
much of Iran’s HEU , with specialty fuel for the research reactor”? This put
Iran in a catch-22 situation; however, they agreed, but the Supreme Leader
refused. This shows that everything is not that straight-forward when it comes
to Iran’s intention to go for the bomb.[7]
Diplomacy vs Military strikes and the views of Pakistan:
Diplomacy is a
vital cog in conducting international relations. It is a process of asserting
one’s power and national interests by overtly benign means of persuasion and
not coercion. As of now, the Iranian nuclear crisis is in the “ripening
process”, it has not yet reached the threshold of a “ripe moment”. Diplomacy
has been thus far used to bell the cat. Much to Bush’s credit, that despite
initiating the preemption doctrine, he opened the door for direct negotiations
after a lapse of 30 years. He launched the famous 1st June offer. In
this section, let’s focus on Obama’s tryst with this challenge. What has been
the mainstay of Obama’s policy as regards Iran? Before going into that, it is
imperative to mention that there are voices against diplomatic engagements, not
only by Obama’s erstwhile rival, Mitt Romney, but others too.
Dore Gold with
this vast experience in the UN has tried to explain the dangers associated with
diplomatic engagements, in his new book, “The
Rise of Nuclear Iran”.[8]
Obama made his intentions very clear even before his inauguration that he
will prioritize the Iranian issue, and would talk to so-called rogue states.
Obama made benign overtures right from the very outset. He gave a video message
on Nowruz with Persian subtitles; this was ostensibly done with a view to
broach upon the fact that the US wanted to resolve all issues. This talk overture directly to the Iranian
leadership came after 30 long years. With the election of the hawkish Benjamin
Netanyahu, pressure began to pile-up on Obama. The latter wanted diplomatic
maneuvers to be given a change to work.
The Israelis were left in a huff when Hillary Clinton talked about
extended deterrence. The Americans at that stage and even now aim to slow down
the process of uranium enrichment; they are mainly concerned with the site at
Natanz. The talks at Geneva were of great significance, for they were the first
after 30 years. Iran agreed to ship 75% of LEU abroad. However, Obama’s
diplomacy was perhaps making Iran bolder; Ahmadinejad , in a press conference
unveiled new centrifuge designs, which were capable of enriching at a faster
rate. He also signaled that two new enrichment plants will be built by March,
2011. Thus, the US and the Europeans felt that they have been duped. A round of
sanctions ensued; Resolution 1929 is just one example of many sanctions that
have been imposed on Iran.
Obama’s penchant
for diplomacy was matched by Israel’s aplomb for punitive action against a
prospective nuclear-armed state. Now, it is not about diplomacy alone; it is
about a pre-emptive strike or “Olympic Games” on Natanz. In a nutshell, Olympic Games alludes
to a joint project of USA and Israel. A computer worm “Stuxnet” is destroying
the centrifuges at Natanz, in the process it has really slowed the otherwise
vigorous enrichment process. Israel’s Mosad is groping for Iranian scientists;
in fact they killed Majid Shahriari in broad day-light. Netanyahu visited the
United States and both leaders talked
about all options that were available. Netanyahu always favored the strike
option; however, Obama has not yet bought that argument. The quagmire
in Afghanistan; internal economy and the ability of Iran to retaliate, makes an
attack highly unfeasible. With his focus
on diplomacy, Obama has not entirely ruled out the war option, in fact war
games and simulations take place, so as to make contingency plans. Israel has stretched a Red Line of 90%
enrichment, if that is crossed, then it will take due note and reprisals will
be witnessed. However, it is imperative to be savvy of the geopolitical compulsions,
while thinking over this dangerous course of action. Iran will retaliate to
anything offered to her, be it a surprise attack or mere diplomatic aggression.
It is better to continue with sanctions and Olympic Games because history tells
us that adversity has also given Iran an impetus to fight back.
Pakistan’s stance:
Before ending
this paper, let’s us touch upon what Pakistan has to say regarding this crisis.
A country beset with problem galore, to include terrorism, political and
economic decay can probably have no weight in international politics, for only
power is currency. However, Pakistan has power when it comes to nukes. Being
the 7th and the fastest growing nuclear power in the world, it has a
stature of its own. Pakistan helped Iran in wherever it has reached today.
Indeed, the Par-1 and Par-2 centrifuges supplied by the clandestine Khan
Network provided Iran with much-needed exposure and expertise. Pakistan has not
spoken vociferously regarding the program; one can call it safe play or
neutrality. One can understand this ambiguity taking into account the Saudi
clout in the country. Former Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz along with Turkish
counterpart Tayyip Erdogan paid a visit to Iran. Both leaders persuaded Ahmadinejad
to change the firm stance on nukes , for his attitude would not benefit Iran
and the whole region. Pakistan has given categorical foreign policy statements
as regards the Iranian nuclear program. Ex Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani met
the Iranian Vice President. Gilani declared wholehearted support for the
Iranian nuclear program , provided it was used for peaceful purposes . Shah
Mehmood Qureshi delivered a lecture at Harvard University as foreign minister.
There , he made strongly-worded statements against alleged Iranian endeavors
towards the bomb. Qureshi said that Iran had no rationale to go for the weapon,
for it had no immediate threat perception, like Pakistan had. Qureshi wanted
Iran to accept US overtures and avoid a confrontation in the region. This is
what Pakistan has said, and rightly so.
The bomb is not yet out, and nobody has issues with the civilian
program. Only time will tell how this saga pans-out.
Bibliography
Cheema, Zafar
Iqbal. “Pakistan’s Posture of Minimum
Credible Deterrence: Current Challenges
and Future Efficacy,” in Nuclear
Pakistan: Strategic Dimension, edited by
Zulfiqar Khan, 43-78 . Karachi: Oxford University Press, Pakistan,
2012.
Khan, Feroz. Eating
Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford Security Studies, 2012.
Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994
.
Patrikarakos, David . Nuclear
Iran: the birth of an Atomic State.London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012.
Gold, Dore. The Rise
of Nuclear Iran. Regnery Publisher, 2009.
[1]
Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “Pakistan’s Posture of Minimum Credible Deterrence:
Current Challenges and Future Efficacy,”
in Nuclear Pakistan: Strategic
Dimension, ed. Zulfiqar Khan( Karachi: Oxford University Press, Pakistan,
2012), 43-78.
[2]
Feroz Khan, Eating Grass : The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Standford
Security Studies, 2012).
[3]
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).
[4]
David Patrikarakos, Nuclear Iran: the
birth of an Atomic State (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012) 16.
[5]
Ibid, 121.
[6]
David E. Sangers, Confront and Conceal
Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising use of American Power ( New York ,
Crown Publishers, 2012).
[7]
Ibid, 183-184.
[8]
Dore Gold, The Rise of Nuclear Iran
( Regnery Publishers, 2009).
Well written, in depth paper on the subject. WIll recommend it.
ReplyDeleteThank you Ray!
ReplyDelete